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Taxing Utility
Terrence Chorvat
Abstract
In order to assess the efficiency of a tax, we should examine its effect on the be-
havior of individuals. In general, the less a tax affects behavior, the more efficient
it is thought to be. The standard example of a non-distorting tax is a lump-sum
tax, which does not change with the behavior of the taxpayer. However, this ar-
ticle demonstrates that behavioral distortions can and do arise from a change in
even a lump-sum tax. The only truly non-distortionary tax would be one based
on utility itself. Utility, which has been used as a norm for distributional analysis,
is also the ideal base for efficiency analysis. In fact, any reasonable attempt to
describe a minimally distortive basis of taxation will significantly resemble the
notion of a tax on utility. Therefore, utility itself is the best basis for evaluation
of the efficiency of a tax. Such a tax has many additional features which make it
more useful for analytical purposes than lump sum taxes.
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Abstract 
 
In order to assess the efficiency of a tax, we should examine its effect on the 
behavior of individuals.  In general, the less a tax affects behavior, the more efficient it is 
thought to be.  The standard example of a non-distorting tax is a lump-sum tax, which 
does not change with the behavior of the taxpayer.  However, this article demonstrates 
that behavioral distortions can and do arise from a change in even a lump-sum tax.  The 
only truly non-distortionary tax would be one based on utility itself. Utility, which has 
been used as a norm for distributional analysis, is also the ideal base for efficiency 
analysis.  In fact, any reasonable attempt to describe a minimally distortive basis of 
taxation will significantly resemble the notion of a tax on utility. Therefore, utility itself is 
the best basis for evaluation of the efficiency of a tax.  Such a tax has many additional 
features which make it more useful for analytical purposes than lump sum taxes.   
  
Income taxes and consumption taxes have assumed a very prominent place in 
public finance in large measure because they are thought to be relatively efficient bases 
for taxation. (Tresch, 2003)  These taxes are considered efficient because it is believed 
that the behavioral response to these taxes is considered to be less elastic to marginal 
increases in the rate of taxation when compared with other bases of taxation such as 
excise taxes on goods and services. (Ramsey, 1927,  Tresch, 2003) This lower behavioral 
response is commonly believed to result in lower losses to welfare than most other 
potential tax bases.  However, as explored in this article, these conclusions are based on a 
number of assumptions about the utility functions of individuals which may not be 
correct. 
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 The primary intent of this article is to put forth three very simple points.  First, the 
standard arguments about how one measures the efficiency of income and other taxes are 
incomplete.  This does not mean they are not useful, but they ignore many important 
aspects of behavior.  Second, these lacunae can cause our analysis to be blind to 
important distortionary elements of a tax. If we do not understand what causes behavior, 
it will be difficult to prevent from distorting behavior unintentionally.  Third, it is 
therefore necessary for any welfare analysis of taxation to study the actual utility 
functions of individuals.  It is here that behavioral economics, experimental economics 
and other empirical economic research can have a significant impact on our analysis. In 
particular, this article will discuss how research tends to indicate that wealth or income 
enters the utility function not as single number (or scalar), but rather in multiple parts 
(i.e., as a vector). 
 As part of the discussion, this article demonstrates that the standard against which 
to measure the efficiency of any tax should be judged should not be a lump-sum or head 
tax, but rather it should be a tax based on utility itself.  The article shows how such a tax 
could be crafted in principle, and demonstrates that the strong assumptions of cardinality 
commonly made in the discussion of such taxes (e.g., Feldstein, 1976) are not necessary 
in order to use a tax on utility as a standard for an efficient tax.  Therefore, unlike the 
discussions of such taxes for distributional purposes, the usefulness of such taxes for 
efficiency analysis is not dependent on the interpersonal comparisons of utility.  Of 
course, actually imposing a tax based on utility at the present time is perhaps even more 
unrealistic than a lump-sum tax; however, as discussed in section II, it is more 
analytically useful. 
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 The article will also briefly discuss some of the challenges to the notion that 
individuals behave consistently with the idea that they have utility functions. This article 
argues that while there is much evidence that contradicts many of the standard notions of 
utility, in general the empirical evidence available does not argue against the entire notion 
of utility, but rather it informs us about the particular forms of utility functions which are 
most likely to represent preferences.  This research may make the analysis more 
complicated, but it does not negate the analytical usefulness of a tax on utility.  
 I. Standard Neoclassical Argument for Income Taxation 
The standard argument concerning the efficiencies of various potential tax bases 
begins by noting that any change in relative prices from that which would exist in the 
market is distortionary, unless it is compensating for an externality.  (Tresch, 2003)  Put 
in another way, we prefer that the tax system not affect behavior, unless the tax system is 
attempting to correct a market imperfection.  For this analysis, we assume that 
individuals have maximized their utilities prior to the imposition of tax, and if taxes alter 
the way decisions are made, this will reduce societal welfare.  Taxes by their nature will 
have income effects (for a discussion of a special case where this might not be the case, 
see Chorvat, 2003a).    If in addition to its income effect, a tax has substitution effects, 
this will increase the behavioral distortion, therefore likely lowering overall welfare. 
(Tresch, 2003)  This additional reduction in welfare is referred to as deadweight loss. 
(Tresch, 2003) 
Income taxes are then generally thought to have lower deadweight loss than 
excise taxes on goods because they do not change relative prices between goods.  Rather, 
they merely reduce the total income of the taxpayers (Varian, 1990, p. 118-119).  In 
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addition, an income tax is also commonly viewed as a fair way to distribute the burden of 
the government, because in some sense, taxpayers are paying for government based on 
the value they receive from our modern society which the government has helped to 
create. (Tresch, 2003) 
 Actually, it is well known that income taxes do alter some relative prices.  In 
particular, they distort both the relative prices of income producing activities versus 
leisure and the relative price of saving versus consumption.  The utility one derives from 
leisure is untaxed, whereas the utility one derives from all monetary rewarding activities 
is reduced by the tax. (Silberberg, 1990, pp. 348-351)  Similarly, the utility one derives 
from consuming income currently is untaxed, whereas part of the utility derived from 
saving (e.g., interest income) is taxed. Therefore, while income taxes are commonly 
thought to be less distortive than many other types of taxes, they still introduce their own 
types of distortions. 
 Consumption taxes on the other hand, do not distort between consumption in 
different periods.  However, as with income taxes, consumption taxes distort the relative 
prices of monetary and non-monetary consumption, and monetary versus psychic income 
production.  Furthermore, consumption taxes may ignore the psychic income of wealth.  
For example, a miser gains psychic income from stockpiles of wealth.  In addition, a 
consumption tax will ignore the insurance value of wealth. The insurance value of wealth 
derives from the fact that we cannot be sure what our are monetary needs will be in the 
future.  Therefore, a risk-averse person will save not only for planned consumption in the 
future, but also for possible risks that may occur in the future. (Tobin, 1958) 
II. Non-Distortionary Taxation 
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A. Head Taxes 
Economists have long understood that income taxes and consumption taxes can 
distort decisions between earning monetary and earning psychic income, and the income 
taxes can also distort between consumption in earlier and later periods.   In place of 
income taxes, the paradigmatic non-distortionary taxes commonly used for analytical 
purposes are head taxes or lump-sum taxes. (Tresch, p. 308) Under these kinds of taxes, 
all individuals pay the same amount of tax regardless of their wealth or income.  Since 
the amount of tax does not depend on behavior, it is normally argued that this kind of tax 
will not distort behavior.  This analysis leads to the conclusion that the deadweight loss of 
such a tax is zero.  However, these arguments ignore the fact that not all utility is derived 
from activities which require money and they also ignore the fact that income and wealth 
are not evenly distributed.  To be specific, a lump-sum tax is likely to distort the 
decisions between the production of monetary versus non-monetary income.  To the 
extent that there are some individuals for whom paying the tax may be a significant 
burden, these people would likely shift some of their productive activities to those that 
generate monetary income, instead of psychic or implicit income, and shift consumption 
activities from those that require a significant amount of money to those that do not.    
The distortion of a lump-sum tax derives from the fact that it increases the relative cost of 
engaging in activities that are pleasurable and require money to engage in compared to 
those that are pleasurable and do not require money.  If one has enough money to pay the 
tax and comfortably exist, then perhaps the distortions induced by a lump-sum tax may 
be small.   Even though such taxes have always been very unpopular and are unlikely to 
raise enough revenue to fund modern governments, these taxes are commonly used as a 
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benchmark against which the efficiency of other taxes is measured. While lump-sum 
taxes are commonly argued to be perfectly non-distortive, we can see that such taxes can 
distort relative prices between monetary and non-monetary goods, due to its requirement 
that it be paid in money. Therefore, even a lump-sum tax has deadweight loss. 
B. Utility as Tax Base 
The only type of tax which would be completely non-distortionary would be one 
on utility itself. This is not to say that we are likely to see such a tax at any time in the 
near future, but rather this conceptual tax is helpful in considering the various distortions 
resulting from alternative systems of taxation.  This section will assume that a utility tax 
is possible and follow the thread of the analysis. 
How would such a tax operate? Taxes are generally determined by applying a tax 
rate to a tax base.  Here, the base would be the utility of the taxpayer, and for simplicity, 
we will initially assume a flat rate of taxation.  Under a tax on utility, no matter what the 
activity, the relative prices would not be changed because in all cases the percent of 
utility removed would be the same. To give an illustration, if one activity yielded 100 
utils, and an alternate activity yielded 99 utils, one would choose to undertake the first 
activity.  This choice would not be affected by a tax which simply removed 20% of the 
utils from each side.  After-tax, the activities would yield 80 and 79.2 utils, respectively.  
In other words, relative values of the activities would not change.  The tax would be 
assessed in such a way that paying it would always result in a reduction in utility of the 
appropriate amount.  The mathematical argument for this is that the effect of the tax is the 
equivalent of simple linear revaluation of the utility function, which under expected 
utility theory should not change choice behavior.  Formally, if the utility from two 
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potential activities can be denominated x and y, and by assumption x > y, then it will 
always be the case that ax > ay, for all a > 0.  No one would ever find it advantageous to 
lower their own utility in order to lower their tax bill, because somewhat paradoxically, if 
they obtained utility from making themselves unhappy, this utility would be taxed. 
One might dispute this idea by arguing that “utility” as such does not exist, rather 
it is a construct we have for predicting the behavior of individuals. Furthermore, the 
notion of “utils” is more of a pedagogical tool for the demonstration of basic principles 
rather than a tool useful for analytical purposes. In more formal terms, this argument is 
stating that utility should be thought of in ordinal terms (i.e., useful in analyzing the 
ordering of preferences into first, second, third, etc.) rather than in cardinal terms (i.e., 
directly comparable utility, such as 100 utils versus 78 utils, etc.).  This ordinality of the 
utility function is derived from the fact that, in general, a utility function can represent 
observed preferences, any monotonic transformation of that function could also represent 
observed preferences. (Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, 1995 pp.11-15) Therefore, in 
order to be of use as a basis of taxation, one has to impose stronger restrictions on the 
utility function.  
One can argue for a tax on utility as the standard of efficiency even if one does 
not assume perfect cardinality of utility.  The argument given above can be rephrased in 
ordinal terms, but restricting the form of the utility function to that used by expected 
utility theory (these are described in Part III.B).  Because these utility functions are 
unique except for affine transformations (as described below), if we simply choose the 
utility function for each person such that the function will always have a value of zero 
when there is zero wealth, we can perform the calculations to demonstrate the invariance 
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of decision-making with and without such taxes.  This concept can also apply if, as I 
suggest later, the argument of the utility function is a vector rather than a scalar.  Part III 
of the article discusses some evidence which might undermine the argument that 
individuals can be even said to have utility functions.  
 Based on this analysis, a tax on utility is the ideal conceptual base, because it will 
not distort behavior.  In addition, to the extent that any other tax departs from this 
standard, it can distort behavior, beyond its income effect, because any tax which differs 
from a utility base can alter the relative values of two or more items and therefore distort 
behavior.  
Others have discussed using utility as a basis for assessing tax rules on 
distributional grounds (Feldstein, 1976).  In fact, the notions of horizontal and vertical 
equity can be most simply stated in terms in of a comparison to a utility tax.  Those 
making such distributional arguments have had to make strong assumptions about the 
cardinality of utility.  These strong cardinality assumptions are not essential for an 
efficiency analysis of tax rules, because for efficiency analysis one does not have to rely 
on interpersonal comparisons of utility as you do with distributional analysis.   Of course, 
to the extent that one does adopt these strong cardinality assumptions, the ideal base both 
for an efficiency analysis as well as for distributional analysis is then a tax on utility. 
One could state the basis for taxation in way similar to the standard formulation of 
the economic definition of income, which is consumption plus net accretions to wealth.  
(Simons, 1938)  If one conceives of the base for utility as occurring during a period of 
time, beginning at time t0, and ending at time t1, then the utility over this period would be: 
  ∫1
0
)(
t
t
dttu
 
 
8
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art17
 where u(t) is the momentary utility at time t or if one treats the taxable period as a 
collection of discrete sub-periods, it would be of the form, 
)( n
n
EU∑  , where En is the wealth in the nth sub-period. 
  Given this base, the amount of the tax could then be 
∫1
0
))((
t
t
dttuF , in the continuous case and 
 in the discrete case ))(( n
n
EUF∑
 or alternatively either  F( ), or ∫1
0
)(
t
t
dttu ))(( n
n
EUF ∑ ,  where F is the function 
which determines the tax based on the amount of utility. 
The reason why such a tax will not distort decisions is the requirement that the 
level of the tax be such that it removes a constant percentage of utility from all possible 
actions.  The dimensions of what this means and how this could be accomplished is 
discussed in the next section. 
 III. Utility Functions: Behavioral Economics and Neoclassical Economics 
To understand how a tax on utility would operate, we first need to understand the tax 
base itself, i.e., the utility functions of individuals.  The previous section discussed why a 
tax on utility is the only truly non-distortive tax.  This section discusses some of the 
research that helps us to understand the nature of actual utility curves and what this 
research can tell us about what a non-distortionary or at least a minimally distortionary 
tax system would look like.  This inquiry can aid us in understanding the distortions that 
our current tax system makes, as well the distortions of proposed alternative systems, 
allowing us to be better able to craft tax rules. 
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A. Deterministic Utility 
The starting point for understanding utility functions is a standard utility curve.  
Under the most primitive form of the function, utility is simply a function of wealth 
(represented as U(W)).  This level of sophistication is sufficient to make the standard 
arguments against distortions introduced by the tax system (Harberger, 1966). That is, 
individuals have already optimized their own utility given their wealth levels etc., and 
therefore altering these decisions can only reduce welfare, ignoring externalities and 
related Pigouvian reasons for a tax (Pigou,1920)  Of course, taxes as whole are intended 
to increase welfare, but not directly.  They increase welfare by providing revenue to fund 
public goods.  Public goods are assumed to increase welfare, while taxes generally 
decrease welfare. To properly analyze the effect of a tax system, one would have to 
examine the net benefits of public goods made possible by the tax revenues minus the net 
costs of taxation and then optimize the level of welfare using the tax as the choice 
variable. (Kaplow, 1994) 
In addition, if we assume that the second derivative of wealth is negative 
( ), then we can derive an argument for re-distributive taxation.  If the marginal 
utility of a dollar to a rich person is less than it is to a poor person, (as follows from 
declining marginal utility of income) taxing the rich at a higher rate comes at a lower 
welfare cost than proportional taxation. (Edgeworth, 1919).  As with almost all utilitarian 
redistribution arguments, this argument requires an ability to make interpersonal 
comparisons of utility.  In addition, there is a need to balance the utility benefits of 
progressive taxation with the decreased incentive for the rich to earn income from taxing 
them at a very high rate. The analysis which derives from these simple assumptions and 
0)( <′′ WU
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the arguments which are derived from them provide the basis of optimal taxation theory. 
(Mirrlees, 1986)  A large body of scholarship is based on the theoretical and empirical 
implications of these relatively simple utility functions. 
Based simply on deterministic utility, it would be quite difficult to assess a tax on 
utility.  Because observed behavior can be rationalized by any monotonic transformation 
of any other function which rationalizes behavior, it is impossible to determine a 
reasonable tax rate.  That is, the tax would depend on the particular from of the utility 
function, which is arbitrary.  Therefore, there would be no principled way to assess the 
tax. 
B. Expected Utility 
One important problem with the rather simple models discussed in section A is 
that they assume that there is no risk and that individuals possess perfect information.  It 
is clear that much of human behavior is designed to deal with the fact that we do not 
know the future. The notion of risk is fundamental to any reasonably accurate description 
of human behavior. The key modification to the utility function in this case is use of an 
expected utility function in which the individual chooses a “portfolio” in order to 
maximize: 
∫p(x)U(x)dx, or ∑ p(x)U(x) in the discrete case, 
where x ∈ X, and x is an outcome and X represents the set of all possible outcomes of an 
investment, gamble etc., p(x) is the either probability of the outcome x in the discrete 
case or the derivative of the cumulative distribution function in the continuous case, and 
U(x) is the utility of an outcome of x. 
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Models of taxation based on expected utility theory commonly address the risk 
sharing and risk transferring aspects of taxation, as well as the appropriate valuation of 
investment and other property received either as compensation, in exchange for other 
items, or as part of a bequest.(Sandmo, 1985)  These models often conclude that the 
behavioral effect, as well as the burden of a tax, may in fact be different than would be 
assumed under a riskless model (Chorvat, 2003a, Myles, 1995). 
As discussed earlier, one of the beneficial features of the model is that it allows 
use to re-cardinalize utility to enough of an extent to allow us to be able to impose a tax 
on utility.  Because expected utility functions are unique up to affine transformations, 
then if we establish a reference point (for example, it we assume a zero level of wealth 
and consumption has a utility of zero), utility values for any set of levels of wealth under 
different sets of utility functions are then proportional to each other.  This causes any 
proportionality factor to wash out in the calculation of taxes. (Mas-Colell, Whinston and 
Green, 1995)  So for example, if we say the a $5 level of consumption has a utility of 5 
and a $10 level has a utility of 9.8, then if we instead denominate the $5 consumption as a 
10 utils and $10 at 19.6 then a 20% tax will still not alter the decision between and the 
amount of the same whether we used the first set of valuations or the second.  That is, x > 
y, then any for any positive proportional scaling ax > ay, and similarly if (1-t)x > (1-t)y, 
then (1-t)ax > (1-t)ay, where t is the tax rate. 
For expected utility theory to be correct, individuals would have to know precise 
probabilities for each event.  Because this was perceived as being somewhat unrealistic, 
Leonard Savage developed a theory that is known as subjective expected utility theory, 
under which individuals behave as if they have a coherent subjective probability for each 
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potential event, even though not all persons might objectively agree to this probability 
(Savage, 1954)  The calculations of subjective expected utility then use this subjective 
probability in the expected utility calculations described above. 
While subjective expected utility would be based on subjective probability 
assessments, this does not in principle void the notion of using these utility functions for 
the assessment of  tax.  While the probability assessments are personal to the individual, 
they are still capable of assessment through studying the behavior of individuals. 
C. Behavioral Utility 
Since the formulation of expected utility theory and its close relative, subjective 
expected utility theory, many scholars have argued that the models based on the 
predictions of these theories do not accurately represent many features of human 
behavior. This literature is sometimes referred to as behavioral economics.  Many types 
of behavior which are inconsistent with expected utility theory have become staples of 
this literature.1  Many scholars have argued that by moving beyond standard expected 
utility theory, we can improve our understanding of utility functions if we introduce 
notions from behavioral economics such as mental accounting, under which the value of 
a dollar of wealth in one form is not necessarily the same as the value of a dollar of 
wealth in an another form, as well as anomalies in how individuals perceive risk and 
uncertainty.  This section discusses a number of empirical phenomena which many 
scholars have argued should be incorporated into our models of economic behavior. 
1. Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes 
Almost as soon as von Neumann and Morgenstern formalized expected utility theory, 
Maurice Allais pointed out that individuals appear to violate its independence axiom 
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when comparing bets that are certain to those which are not.2 (Allais, 1953)  Allais 
presented a “paradox” or more accurately, he suggested a number of sequences of 
gambles for which he argued that many people would violate expected utility theory. A 
commonly used illustration of the behavioral paradoxes is the observation of how 
individuals behave when confronted with choices similar to the following: 
First, select one of two gambles 
 
A: win $1,000 for sure and  
 
B: you have a 10% chance to win $2,000, an 89% chance to win $1,000, 
and a 1 % chance to win $0. 
 
Now, choose which of the following two gambles you prefer: 
 
C: an 11% chance to win $1,000, and an 89% chance of winning nothing 
versus  
 
D: a 10% chance to win $2,000, and a 90% chance to win zero. 
 
Under expected utility theory, the utility of a gamble is always the linear 
combination of the utilities of the various outcomes multiplied by their probabilities.  
Given this, it can be easily demonstrated that an individual who chose gamble A, should 
choose gamble C, nonetheless those who choose A commonly select D.  The weight of 
experimental evidence indicates that many people do behave in the way predicted by 
Allais. (Camerer, 1995) 
 One of the ways this behavior is explained is to postulate that certainty is 
somehow valued discontinuously (Camerer, 1995). This would argue that individuals 
value sure bets over risky bets in a way that is not consistent with standard neoclassical 
analysis, at least as it has come to be known in either expected utility theory or subjective 
utility theory. Another explanation comes from the fact that it appears that often 
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individuals do not treat compound lotteries in the way predicted by expected utility 
theory (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991).  There are a number of other proposed 
alternative theories.  (Camerer, 1995) 
While behavioral phenomena, to the extent that they do not violate rationality, 
may make the computation of the utility functions more complicated, they do not negate 
the notion of a tax based on utility. In fact, they likely make the utility functions even 
more unique than even expected utility theory did and so increase the theoretical 
feasibility of such taxes, although it may complicate the practicalities of it. 
 About a decade after Allais described this behavioral paradox, Daniel Ellsberg 
published an article that criticized the assumption of subjective expected utility that 
individuals behave as if they have subjective coherent probabilities for events. (Ellsberg, 
1961) He argued that uncertainty can be divided into risk and ambiguity and that these 
two can operate independently to alter choice behavior. This argument can be illustrated 
by the choice between two different gambles.  Imagine that there is an urn which contains 
30 red balls and 60 balls additional balls which are either black or yellow, but we do not 
know the distribution of those two colors of balls.  You will select between two gambles: 
A: you receive a payoff of $10 if a red ball is selected or 
B: you receive a payoff of $10 if a yellow ball is selected. 
If you select A, then under subjective expected utility theory, this indicates that 
you believe the probability of red (P(red)) is greater than the probability of yellow 
(P(yellow)), or P(yellow) < 1/3.  Because by assumption, twice the P(red) is equal to 
P(yellow)  + P(black), this implies that P(black) > P(red), or numerically P(black) > 1/3 
Now imagine you asked to select between two additional gambles: 
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C: you receive a $10 payoff if red or black is selected 
D: you receive a $10 payoff if yellow or black is selected. 
 If you selected A and then selected D, you have violated  the assumption of coherent 
probabilities.  If you believe that P(black) > 1/3, then P(black or red) > 2/3.  However, by 
assumption P(black or yellow) = 2/3.  Therefore, if one chooses A, you should choose C.   
If you chose A and D, you have indicated that you are averse to gambles with ambiguous 
probabilities. 
 Experiments that have been conducted following up on Ellsberg’s famous article 
have shown that many individuals do indeed behave the way that Ellsberg predicted. 
(Camerer, 1995)  It is commonly concluded that this implies that the lack of knowledge 
or ambiguity in probability also seems to affect utility functions (see chapter 6 of Mas–
Colell et al., 1995).  This distinction between known probabilities and unknown 
probabilities had been discussed earlier by Frank Knight, (Knight, 1921)  as well as John 
Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1921). 
By adding ambiguity to the utility function, it again complicated the function, but 
does not diminish the theoretical possibility of such a tax.  Ambiguity seems to introduce 
a new kind of uncertainty, but one which is likely to behave in ways similar to risk.  In 
fact, the behavior of individuals with respect to ambiguity may be closer to standard 
expected utility theory than with regard to risk. (Smith et al. 2002) 
2. Mental Accounts 
In addition to the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, there have been a number of 
other empirical phenomena which appear to violate expected utility theory.  One example 
is that individuals appear to divide various forms of wealth into separate mental accounts 
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rather than including all wealth in one joint calculation.  (Thaler, 1999).  Under standard 
expected utility theory, the argument of the utility function is simply wealth.   Mental 
accounting would imply that the argument of the utility function is a vector, rather than a 
scalar. 
The notion of mental accounting was developed to explain certain inconsistencies 
between expected utility based models and observed behavior.  Mental accounting  has 
been used to explain the empirical evidence which indicates that the marginal propensity 
to consume is not uniform among different types of income, but varies with the form of 
income.  For example, the marginal propensity to consume income from increases in the 
value of one’s stock market portfolio is far smaller in comparison to that for labor income 
than would be predicted by the permanent income hypothesis.  One study conducted by 
Case et al. looked at the effect of stock ownership and other forms of wealth on the 
marginal propensity to consume. They found the marginal propensity to consume 
earnings from stock was very small (below 1% or a marginal propensity to consume of 
.01) and the marginal propensity to consume income out of housing wealth was higher 
(about .09).  This was contrasted with the marginal propensity to consume for labor 
income which is estimated to be between .6-.8. (Case et al., 2001, Cheng and French, 
2000).  The authors of this study argue that this occurs because wealth in the form of 
one’s house is viewed as being more stable.  These findings would indicate that the utility 
function of individuals are therefore not simple functions of wealth, but have at least 
three variables in the argument (i.e., stock market income, housing income, and labor 
income).  While one might rationally expect the marginal propensity to consume out of 
stock wealth to be less than labor income (because the first might arguably be a one-time 
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shock and the second may represent a permanently higher stream of income), almost any 
reasonable theory based on the permanent income hypothesis cannot explain a difference 
of this magnitude, nor can it explain the difference between housing wealth and stock 
market wealth. In addition, recent experimental economic evidence suggests that 
individuals keep wealth from risky assets such as stock in a separate mental account from 
wealth in less risky forms of wealth, such as bonds. (Rockenbach, 2004).  
 Another example in which individuals seem to form mental accounts is the 
behavior exhibited by contestants on game shows. (Gertner, 1993)   In one study, actual 
bets on a game show studied averaged $3,200.  When the cash stake available from 
betting increased by $1, bets increased by about $.60  But when the amount of earnings 
that could not be bet increased (e.g., when a contestant won a car) by $1, bets increased 
by only a penny.  While the contestant may not have valued the prize as much as the 
stated value, it seems highly unlikely that they would value it at only 1% of stated value 
(they could almost certainly sell it for substantially more than that). Similar results have 
been found by others. (Thaler and Johnson, 1990, Biswanger, 1981) This behavior is 
inconsistent with the prediction from neo-classical economics that contestants should 
integrate all assets (bettable cash and unbettable prizes) then bet based on their integrated 
assets.  In particular, based on the behavior of individuals, non-liquid assets appear to be 
valued at a substantial discount to liquid assets of equivalent market value. 
B. Anomalous Time Discounting 
It has been observed that individuals do not seem to follow the standard exponential 
discounting for determining the value of future payments.  (Strotz, 1956).  One of the 
commonly used ways to incorporate this concept into utility functions is the β-δ model of 
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David Laibson, in which there is a distinction between consuming now and consuming  
later in addition to standard exponential discounting.  Under standard exponential 
discounting the value of any payoff which will be received n periods from the present is 
of the form δnU(wn), where δ is the discount rate per period, and wn is the wealth that will 
be received in the nth period.  Under the Laibson model, if you are to receive the payoff 
now, its value is U(w), but if you are to receive it n periods in the future it is β δnU(wn), 
with β < 1. There is now some neurological evidence that individuals conceive of trade-
offs between now and the future in a manner consistent with this model. (McClure, 
Laibson, Lowenstein, and Cohen, 2004)  
To the extent that individuals discount for the time value of money in a non-
exponential fashion, financial models based on exponential discounting will not predict 
the behavior of individual investors.  It has been argued that we can better explain many 
of the behavioral anomalies such as the equity premium puzzle by introducing models 
based on these non-exponential time discounting models (Benartzi and Thaler, 1996).   
Another way in which individuals appear to violate standard exponential discounting 
models is the violation of what is referred to as the permanent income hypothesis. The 
standard model of the permanent income hypothesis is that the marginal propensity to 
consume out of all expected lifetime wealth, whether in the form of stocks, real estate, or 
any other source, should be the same relatively small number.  That is, ignoring the time 
value of money and uncertainty, if an individual expects to live N periods and will have a 
total lifetime wealth of W, the individual will want to consume W/N each period.  An 
increase in wealth in one period will increase lifetime wealth by only a small percentage 
and so should increase current consumption by only a small amount.  The amount of 
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lifetime wealth (W) needs to be discounted for when the wealth arises, as well as the 
uncertainty surrounding it and the value of future consumption will also have to 
discounted as well. The empirical studies of this question tend to find that while there is a 
fair amount of smoothing of consumption over a lifetime, there is also an excessive 
relation between consumption and the actual realization of income.(Flavin, 1981, 
Campbell and Mankiw, 1989)  Hence, a short-term increase in income received increases 
the amount of consumption more than the permanent income hypothesis predicts. 
Interestingly, consumption patterns at odds with the permanent income hypothesis 
can also be found in to day-to-day consumption patterns.  One interesting finding is that 
people spend more on payday than on other days.(Stephens, 2002a, Stephens, 2002b)  It 
does not appear that this phenomenon is significantly related to liquidity constraints 
because in fact, the studies have found little correlation between credit cards and 
increased spending on payday (although wealth and other socioeconomic factors did play 
a key role). 
 3. Loss Aversion 
 One important way in which individuals appear to depart from expected utility is 
the method of accounting for potential losses, which may be related to the explanation of 
the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes.  An area which has been a particular focus of study 
has been the disposition of portfolio assets. Traditional expected utility theory, in 
conjunction with the portfolio theories, such as the efficient market hypothesis which is 
based upon expected utility theory, predict that investors should be indifferent between 
selling or retaining any particular portfolio asset, because it is fairly priced.  Under a tax 
system which does not assess a tax until there has been a sale (or more accurately a 
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realization event), investors should sell their investments that have lost money and retain 
those which have increased in value.3 This is the most rational thing to do if you assume 
that the current price is the correct value of the asset, and you can defer the tax on the any 
gain by retaining those assets which have increased in value.(Odean, 1993 and Sheffrin 
and Statman, 1985)  However, empirical evidence indicates that, in fact, individuals sell 
the stocks that have increased in value and retain those which have lost value longer than 
they would if they were behaving “rationally”, even ignoring tax incentives. This 
phenomenon extends beyond common stocks to include stock options, and residential 
housing. (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, Heath et al., 1999).   
 d. Functional Forms of Behavioral Utility 
Just as there are many behavioral phenomena which appear to violate standard 
expected utility theory, there are also a number of theories which attempt to correct for 
these deficiencies. One of the first was put forward by Harry Markowitz, who argues that 
is possible that utility functions are best viewed not as based simply on wealth, but rather 
changes to wealth. (Markowitz, 1952) In addition, individuals may be risk averse as to 
gains (i.e., they have a concave utility function for gains) and risk preferring as to losses 
(they have convex utility function for losses).  Of course, these concepts are also key 
elements of behavioral economic models such as prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). 
There is a fair degree of evidence from the emerging field of neuroeconomics that 
individuals do not perceive gain and loss in the way predicted by expected utility theory. 
This evidence also helps to support some of basic notions of prospect theory and its 
variants, while adding intriguing differences. One study has found that risky situations 
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involving losses and risky situations that involve gains are perceived in two different 
regions of the brain.  In addition, situations with ambiguous probabilities are perceived in 
yet another region of the brain. (Smith et al., 2002)  Interestingly, this study found that 
risky gains and losses were valued along the lines of prospect theory, while gains and 
losses with ambiguous probabilities were valued in ways more akin to expected utility 
theory. (Chorvat, 2002)  This evidence helps to demonstrate that Ellsberg’s distinction 
between risk and ambiguity in fact has a neurological basis.  The neurological evidence 
indicates that the reference point from which calculations are made would appear to be 
the expectations of wealth or gains rather than the amount of wealth prior to the event.  
Therefore, to extent that future research findings are consistent with these results, a key 
element of any understanding of investor behavior will be the nature of how expectations 
are formed.  Interestingly, prospect theory discusses how the nature of the “framing” of 
the problem can result in a different behavior.  One recent study on the differences in 
framing then can significantly affect perception of an event (McClure, Li, Tomlin, 
Cypert, Montague and Montague, 2004) 
 These experiments do not necessarily directly contradict expected utility theory 
for at least two reasons. First of all, the argument of the utility function could easily be 
something other than terminal wealth, such as changes to wealth.  Second, the tasks 
involved in the overwhelming majority of such experiments only test very short-term 
processing rather than time frames normally considered in economics and therefore the 
implications for longer decisions are unclear.  Nonetheless, the results of these 
experiments certainly paint a different picture of what is occurring in the decision-making 
processes of individuals.  
 
 
22
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art17
 4. The Existence of Utility Functions 
In recent years, there have been a number of attacks not only on expected utility 
theory and its variants, but on the notion that individuals can be said to have consistent 
utility functions at all.  The idea of a utility function has been skeptically received from 
its inception.  Samuelson’s revealed preference theory was an early attempt to get away 
from the notion of a utility function. (Samuelson, 1938) However, as is well-known, if 
there are only a finite number of possible choices and a rich enough choice set, then 
revealed preference theory and utility theory are mathematically equivalent.  (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green, 1995)  The phenomena discussed in the earlier sections such as 
non-exponential discounting and mental accounting can be interpreted as modifications to 
utility theory which can be accommodated by making the utility function more complex.  
However, to the extent that experiments demonstrate that individuals not only have some 
odd risk preferences (See e.g., Rabin, 2000, Rabin and Thaler, 2001) but actually 
intransitive preferences  (see, e.g., May 1954, and Lichentstein and Slovic (1971)) it is 
difficult to discuss the notion of a utility function at all.  Transitive preferences are an 
essential element for the existence of a utility function (Jehle and  Reny, 2001) 
 Another example of this type of challenge can be found in the distinction, 
championed most recently by Daniel Kahneman, between experienced utility and 
behavioral utility. (Kahneman, 2003)  This research indicates that there is a difference 
between the happiness we experience at the time of an event and the utility that 
influences our behavior in later situations.  If these are in fact two different things, then 
the notion of single utility function for individuals may be problematic.  Standard utility 
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theory assumes that we make choices so as to optimize our well-being given our 
constraints. 
Another problem is the likely heterogeneity of the functional form of utility functions 
among individuals, as opposed to merely heterogeneity in the parameters of the functions 
such as risk aversion.  That is, individuals might not only have different tastes for wealth 
or other goods, but the functional forms themselves (e.g., standard expected utility versus 
rank dependent expected utility) might be heterogeneous.  There is evidence from many 
experiments that some individuals follow expected utility theory, while many others do 
not. (Camerer, 1995)  While this would complicate the application of a utility tax, in that 
it might imply the tax levied on different individuals might have different utility 
functions, in principle it would not alter the conclusion that a tax based on the utility 
function would be the most efficient tax.   
 D. Applications to Taxation 
The notion of utility as the most efficient basis for taxation can be applied to the 
analysis of potential systems of taxation in a number of ways.  Conceiving of the norm as 
a tax on utility causes us to focus on the actual utility curves of individuals.  Using a tax 
on utility as a standard can help to clarify notions such as the taxation of psychic income 
and related items such as the potential taxation of value of owner-occupied housing, 
which many countries in fact tax. (Ault & Arnold, 2004)  Such ideas are much more 
readily apparent from a utility tax base than from a monetary income base. 
A utility analysis may to help to explain a number of tax law doctrines, which are 
nearly universal and would otherwise be quite anomalous. One such doctrine is the 
realization doctrine.  Under this doctrine, income or losses from an investment in 
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property are not included in taxable income until the property is sold and the income 
from it is “realized”. This doctrine is often argued to be the cause of many of the 
problems of the tax system, because it fails to track income as it is earned. (Chorvat 
2003b)  As discussed earlier, if utility is based on wealth, the failure of the tax laws to 
track the economic definition of income (Simons, 1938) will result in distortions to 
behavior which are caused by the tax system, resulting in deadweight loss.  However, if 
the realization doctrine is in fact more in accord with utility curves of many individuals, 
then it may actually be increasing the efficiency of the tax system.(Chorvat, 2003b)  
Based on the econometric evidence which shows that individuals do not consume very 
much out of increases to stock market wealth, one can argue that it is at least plausible 
that unrealized stock market wealth is not valued as highly as other increases to wealth.  
This implies that unrealized income may not be valued as highly as realized income, and 
hence should not be taxed as severely. 
A utility analysis of the tax system might also help us to think more positively 
about our current hybrid income tax system (which is neither a consumption tax nor pure 
income tax). One might argue that actually the current income tax structure comes closer 
to taxing utility than either a pure income or pure consumption tax.  This is true because 
neither consumption nor income is not necessarily the same as utility.  As noted, income 
might simply be saving for future consumption and so taxing it as it is earned would be 
too early, while a consumption tax would not reach significant portions of economic 
income, such as the insurance value of wealth.    While one might argue that the current 
tax system does not necessarily reach utility particularly well either, such an analysis 
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does provide an argument for a system which is different than either a pure consumption 
or pure income tax, but rather a combination of the two. 
Another example of where utility might be helpful as an ideal base would be the 
analysis of provisions which impose lower rates of tax on retirement saving.  To the 
extent that one invests in saving for retirement, you will not enjoy the increases in value 
in your retirement account for decades.  If individuals utilize hyperbolic discounting or 
other non-exponential methods of accounting for the time value of money, then they will 
likely value increases in our retirement accounts significantly less than increases in salary 
or other forms of wealth. (Laibson, 1997)  It is a common experience that we know we 
must save for retirement, yet we do not enjoy it very much.  One might argue that it is 
then proper to tax earnings on our retirement accounts at a lower rate because we do not 
enjoy such earnings as much as other income. Therefore, if we were to tax them at the 
same rate, they would be overtaxed. 4
Another application for which one might use the utility analysis described above 
is to incorporate the research on concepts such as prospect theory or other income based 
expected utility theories.  These models argue that it is changes to wealth, rather than 
wealth itself that people value.  To the extent this is true, income taxes would more 
closely track utility than wealth taxes.  In fact, taken to its logical extreme this line of 
inquiry would argue for a transactions tax, because many experiments indicate that this 
might more closely approximate how individuals appear to perceive utility.  However, the 
strength of this conclusions would depend on precisely how individuals assess gains, and 
the extent to which they group transactions together. 
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Using utility as a base would also be helpful in understanding the question of 
whether we ought to give regional adjustments to income tax rates. The argument is that, 
in reality, a dollar of income in Los Angeles is not really the same thing as a dollar of  
income in Little Rock. (Knoll and Griffith, 2003).  To the extent this is true, the use of 
utility as the tax base would pick up these differences and tax them appropriately. 
Others have also discussed the impact of behavioral economic considerations to 
the analysis of tax rules.  This has mostly been to explain how the rules we observe are 
the result of voters not necessarily fully understanding or caring about the impact of tax 
rules on them (McCaffery, 2000, McCaffrey and Baron, 2004).  This research helps to 
explain why we observe the tax rules that we do.  Furthermore, it may help to choose the 
optimal tax rules, by allowing us to better understand the choice set we face. 
 It is not the intention of this article to argue in depth for any of the particular 
applications discussed, but rather merely to show that this analysis can be applied to the 
most basic questions of the tax law. In addition, because these arguments are empirical in 
nature, it is of course true that all of these arguments depend upon the evidence that 
further research will discover.  It is therefore incumbent upon us to go out and discover 
how individuals actually behave. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Any reasonable attempt to describe a minimally distortive basis of taxation will 
significantly resemble the notion of a tax on utility. Therefore, utility itself is the best 
basis for evaluation of the efficiency of a tax. This article argues that the paradigmatic 
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base against which taxes should be measured should not be a lump-sum tax, but rather a 
tax based on utility. 
 There are three fundamental points that this article has tried to demonstrate. First, 
that the standard arguments about how one measures the efficiency of income and other 
taxes are incomplete in part because they generally assume that all forms of wealth, no 
matter how derived, are equally valued.  Second,  because wealth and income do not 
enter into most individuals utility functions in so simple a manner, standard income, 
consumption or wealth taxes can be cause significant distortions.  Third, therefore, we 
need to consider actual utility functions in order to craft optimal tax rules.  Here, 
behavioral economics, experimental economics and other empirical economic research 
should play a significant role in our analysis impact on our analysis. 
It has long been acknowledged that humans do not think precisely in the way 
some standard economic models have considered.  This was acknowledged by the early 
marginalist scholars.5  It is now clear that utility functions, to extent that they can be 
argued to exist, are likely to be quite complicated.   In order to truly understand the 
effects of a tax, we need to understand how individuals actually respond both to 
improvements to their welfare as well as to the tax itself. 
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1 This literature is vast. For a discussion of many of these “anomalies” see the chapters in  CHOICES, 
VALUES AND FRAMES, (Daniel Kahneman et al.  eds, 2000).  
2 Under the independence axiom, if Gamble X has a value greater than Gamble Y, and if gamble Z is 
independent of X and Y, then the value of Gamble (X+Z) must be greater than the value of Gamble (Y+Z).  
This axiom, rather like Euclid’s fifth postulate, is less obvious than the other axiom’s of von Neumann- 
Morgenstern expected utility (and consequently Savage’s subjective expected utility).  Because if this it has 
drawn more criticism than the other axioms.  The Allais Paradox was first discussed  in Maurice Allais, Le 
Comportement de l’Homme Rationel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole 
Américane, 21 ECONOMETRICA  503 (1953)     
3 In order to make a prediction about how someone will react to changes in the market, we have to first 
understand how the individual will perceive those changes in the market. See Vernon Smith, 
Microeconomics Systems as an Experimental Science 72 AMERCIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 923 (1982).  In 
particular, the one purpose of institutions is to generate messages which are perceived by the individual. 
The purpose of economics experiments is to determine how individuals behave given particular 
environments and particular institutional settings.  
4 It is of course possible to argue that earnings in the retirement simply allow individuals to save less now.   
5 For example Alfred Marshall stated “In all this they deal with man as he is: not with an abstract or 
“economic” man; but with a man of flesh and blood.  They deal with a man who is largely influenced 
by egoistic motives in his business life to a great extent ... but who is also neither above vanity and 
recklessness, nor below delight in doing his work well for its own sake, or in sacrificing himself for 
the good of his family, his neighbors, or his country, a man who is not below the love of a virtuous life 
for its own sake.” Alfred Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 22 (1890). 
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